Hill 112_The Battle of the Odon Page 8

  To the south of the Odon, 46 Highland Brigade’s third battalion, 7/Seaforth Highlanders, along with B Squadron 7/RTR had more of a battle. They found themselves fighting along 1st SS Panzer Division’s battle outpost line, which was dominated by the enemy’s main positions on the Eterville –Louvigny ridge. The plan was to advance on a company frontage, in four bounds, with each company taking its turn to lead. The first three bounds went well but the fourth, by D Company, found the enemy very active in the area of le Mesnil. If 4/Dorsets and 9/RTR had not been successful in and around Eterville and taken much of the Leibstandarte’s immediate attention, the task of clearing the valley would have been far more difficult. The Seaforth’s attack was complicated by the fact that it was through hedgerows, woods, farms and orchards. Consequently, in close Bocage type country, their progress was much slower than that of 2/Glasgow Highlanders on the north bank of the Odon and it was only ‘After hard fighting they reached their objective, le Mensil, about 7 p.m.’. Here they eventually made contact with the advancing Canadians who had been advancing from Carpiquet towards Louvigny.

  6 Troop, B Squadron, 7/RTR supported 46 Brigade’s attack, 10 July 1944.

  The Seaforth’s regimental history recounts the tale of a German operator, speaking very good English, joining the Battalion’s Mortar Platoon radio net:

  1st SS Leibstandarte Panzer Division

  An SS Panzer Grenadier Company HQ beneath a knocked out tank.

  ‘During the action, a voice came on the Mortar Officer’s set - “You think you can shoot, see how German mortars shoot”, and a stonk landed all around him. “Are you still there? Good shooting, yes?” Back went the answer: “Bloody awful, is this better?” and stonked four likely spots. No more was heard.’

  CHAPTER FOUR

  OPERATION JUPITER

  Attack on Maltot village and Cornwall Wood

  130 Brigade′s attack on Maltot

  While 129 Brigade′s advance on to Hill 112 was checked on the German ′stop line′, 130 Brigade, who had taken the German forward positions at Chateau de Fontaine and Eterville, launched 7/Hampshires, into the depths of the enemy′s defences. Their objective was Maltot and the woods on the ridge to the south of the village. The plan was that with Maltot taken, 4 Armoured Brigade would then advance to the River Orne crossings and the open ′tank country′ beyond. Success of this advance beyond Chateau de Fontaine and Eterville was predicated on 129 Brigade taking the dominating Hill 112 feature and denying its fire positions to the enemy. This had not happened, despite some heroic efforts against the well prepared 21 SS Panzer Grenadiers and the Tigers of 102/SS Heavy Panzer Battalion.

  Heinz Harmel, in his command vehicle, directs operations in the Maltot area.

  By 06.00 hours, 7/Hampshires were waiting to occupy their FUP south of Fontaine Etoupefour, which had already been used by both 4 and 5/Dorsets. On receipt of a report at 08.16 hours that objectives had been reached along the Caen to Evrecy road, 7/Hampshires, with A Squadron 9/RTR, advanced between the Dorset battalions towards Maltot. ′This…′ as the Regimental Historian records: ′…entailed a long advance down the forward or enemy slope of the ridge through tall ripe corn with but little cover′.

  Joining the advance were two companies of 5/Dorsets, who advanced on 7/Hampshires′ right flank. Artillery Forward Observation Officers (FOOs) in carriers, half-tracks and in Observation Post variants of the Churchill, mounting dummy guns, moved with the advancing infantry. The OC of 220 Battery, Major Penrose, travelled with the Hampshires′ commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel DWG Ray, and one of the FOOs, Captain Paul Cash advanced with the leading companies. They were on hand to accurately adjust fire onto the village of Maltot and opportunity targets. However, intelligence was that ′the village was lightly held if at all′ and, consequently, there was to be no mind numbing barrage to subdue the Germans. At 08.35 hours 9/RTR recorded that they ran into trouble. The adjutant, Captain John Hodges, described what happened:

  ′The tanks reached the orchards surrounding the village and the infantry entered. At this stage, everything seemed to go wrong. The tanks were caught in a murderous cross-fire from beyond the river on their left and from the woods and reverse slope of Hill 112, the latter being the objective of 7/RTR who failed to take it.′

  What had gone wrong? The Hampshires, who were supported by 5/Dorsets and A Squadron 9/RTR, had penetrated deep into the enemy positions. The cross fire from anti-tank weapons from the left flank of the advance was from the remnants of 1st and 12th SS Panzer Divisions, while the shot and shell from the area of Hill 112 and Maltot came mainly from 1st Company, 102/SS Heavy Panzer Battalion, who had moved into battle positions from St Martin. One platoon remained on the dominating reverse slope ridge of Hill 112, while the second platoon of four tanks, under command of SS Oberscharführer Baral, rushed down to Maltot, arriving at almost exactly the same time as the Hampshires. The Tigers pushed through the narrow streets of Maltot and reached the northern side of the village. SS Rottenführer Willi Fey commanded the leading tank:

  Mk VII Churchill. It was heavily armoured but seriously under-gunned and stood little chance against anti-tank guns and panzers. This Churchill is in position on Hill 112 today and acts as a memorial to the British soldiers who fought and died their in the summer of 1944.

  ′We reached the edge of the village. Wasting no time, we pushed through the hedges. There in front of us were four Sherman tanks [Churchills?]. Panzer halt! On the left hand, tank 200 metres. Fire at will! Two rounds finished off the one on the left, the one on the right suffered a similar fate and our platoon commander pushed forward to knock out a third. The fourth sought safety by rushing back along the road! It was a great boost to our young panzer crew.′

  SS-Rottenführer Willi Fey

  All German accounts describe these tanks as Shermans but at this stage of the battle, only Churchills were involved. Probably the similar profile of the accompanying M10 Tank Destroyer confused them. Recognition of British armour was not the forte of a newly formed unit, in action in the west for the first time. Whatever the source of the error, what is certain is that 7/RTR and the M10s were fighting for their own lives. In consequence, they were in no position to lend the kind of help to the infantry that they had given so effectively at Chateau de Fontaine, Eterville and on Hill 112.

  A Tiger of a German Heavy Tank Battalion west of Caen.

  Despite the presence of the Tigers and lack of barrage, by 09.15 hours, 7/Hampshire had occupied Maltot and signalled this to Headquarters 130 Brigade by wireless. However, ′In actual fact, they had merely superimposed themselves on top of a very strongly held enemy defended locality.′ This criticism of 7/Hampshires by Brigadier Essame in the divisional history forgets that the Division, during five years of training, had adopted these tactics. The Wyvern′s tactical doctrine was to push through a village bypassing enemy strong points but at the same time breaking up the cohesion of the enemy′s defence. Once through the leading companies, they were to establish defensive positions in order to prevent the Germans reinforcing or counter-attacking into the village. Meanwhile, the following companies were to clear the houses, buildings and hedgerows in detail. As a brigade commander in the Wessex Division, Brigadier Essame should have remembered this. In the case of Eterville these tactics had worked, albeit more slowly than predicted, but at Maltot conditions were very different. Firstly, this was not a frontline position but one in the heart of the enemy defences. Secondly, Maltot was surrounded on three sides by enemy armour and anti-tank guns in positions to the rear of Hill 112, overlooking the village. Thirdly, the presence of Tigers in significant strength unexpectedly swung the balance of forces in the Germans′ favour.

  SS-Rottenführer Willi Fey in the turret of Tiger 134.

  On the right flank of 7/Hampshires′ advance on Maltot, 5/Dorsets were in action. A and B Companies had objectives in the area of a triangular orchard to the west of the village. B Company secured its objective and was attempting to dig in on the o
pen ground to the south of the orchard, when it found itself the Tigers′ immediate target. Driven back to the cover of the fruit trees, B Company left their dead and wounded as a testament to the hopelessness of its task while Hill 112 remained occupied by the enemy. 5/Dorsets′ memorial stands on the open slopes of the Hill looking down on Chateau de Fontaine and Maltot; a view that the SS panzers were using to their advantage. A Company was more fortunate; it had veered to the left of its objective and was eventually located nearer the outskirts of the village. To help 9/RTR who were suffering heavily from the fire of Hill 112, C Company 5/Dorsets was brought up from reserve to advance and clear a small triangular wood. This was in fact a small field hedged by trees occupied by infantry of 21 Panzer Grenadiers, along with three tanks, possibly Tigers. The enemy infantry withdrew as the British artillery and mortar fire lifted and the leading platoons charged. However, the Dorsets were to find that bayonets were of little use against the panzers spitting machine-gun fire from mutually supporting positions. The Company withdrew back towards Chateau de Fontaine. Still in forward positions, A and B Companies were ordered to attempt to assist 7/Hampshires in Maltot but were under such pressure themselves that it was all they could do to hold their positions. They remained all day in hastily dug, but continually improved, slit trenches to the west of Maltot, subjected to both German and British artillery fire.

  Once in Maltot, 7/Hampshires′ leading companies attempted to push on through to the ridgeline to the south. Major Gordon Viner commanding A Company recalls that,

  ′I was relieved to capture the first hedgerow and get a foothold in the village but to advance further proved negative as the village was heavily defended by numerous Tiger tanks and well-trained SS troops, both well concealed and dug-in.′

  Nobby Norman and his crew in front of their Churchill tank.

  B Company, on the left, was more successful and, under a growing weight of fire, advanced some three hundred metres south-east towards the wooded banks of the River Orne. Here it ran into the remnants of the HitlerJugend. Few soldiers of B Company survived the encounter and those that did were nearly all wounded and found themselves prisoners of war. Nineteen year old Private Davies of B Company was one of the wounded who was eventually taken prisoner. He has written that:

  ′Major Tompkins yelled for us to charge… . We chased the remaining enemy out of the gardens killing a few on the way and rushed through the alleys to the road and on to the other side. The village looked deserted and the houses undamaged, ground floor windows were boarded up but glass was intact in some of the higher windows… On the south side of the village in the rear gardens we were met by a Mark IV tank [not the Churchill they had been expecting] which blasted us with heavy MG and explosive shells. Major Tompkins yelled for us to charge the woods about fifty yards away to our half left. For about an hour – though it could have been much longer – we played a cat and mouse game with the Germans, each side taking pot shots at anything that moved. At some time in the afternoon I was hit by shrapnel from two hand grenades. …It was evening when the Germans finally rushed us.′

  At 09.55 hours, 7/Hampshires′ war diary records that forward elements, 400 metres south of Maltot, were attempting to dig in but counter-attacks were making it ′…imperative to withdraw – Tigers and infantry attacking from south-east and the southwest.′ Meanwhile, among the houses, Battalion Headquarters, C and D Companies attempted to clear the village in detail. They found to their cost that it was prepared for defence and held in strength by 22 SS Panzer Grenadier′s Engineer and Reconnaissance Companies. The enemy had sheltered in the cellars dug deep into the limestone and had emerged behind 7/Hampshires′ leading companies. Private Jim Jones vividly remembers fighting amongst the houses:

  Sergeant Nobby Norman and three of his crew being questioned by Harmel after their capture near Maltot. The shock of being knocked out and captured is evident on their faces. See action on page 104.

  ′The windows and doors of some of the houses were boarded up. We soon realized that these were the defended ones. As we passed on through, we fired into them and posted grenades where we could. We thought that we were taking a lightly defended village as promised by our HQ. But they [the Germans] came to life once we had passed.′

  The Hampshires may have driven off, or at least subdued the defenders for a period, but at 10.35 hours their war diary records that ′nine of our tanks KO. German inf sp by Tigers infiltrating back into the village. Being heavily mortared′. However, their problems had really begun somewhat earlier. Following close behind the rifle companies and the Commanding Officer′s party were the ′soft skin vehicles′ of Main Battalion Headquarters with the Battalion′s only truly reliable radio sets. Parked alongside a building in Maltot′s main street they were soon destroyed, having just confirmed to 130 Brigade that they were in control of the village. Left with only man-pack radios to pass messages back, the Hampshires were effectively out of touch with their brigade headquarters, as the rough treatment entailed in fighting in villages took its toll on the sensitive, valve technology radios. In addition, the radio operators were soon too busy fighting for their lives to want to fight for communications. At 10.15 hours, against mounting opposition, the Commanding Officer was wounded while attempting to organize his battalion in strong points at the centre of Maltot. Patched up, he was back in action and commanding his Battalion′s defence at the village crossroads, but little more than fifteen minutes later he was wounded again. A soldier nearby saw ′A number of Hampshires tied white handkerchiefs to their rifles… Lieutenant Colonel Ray stood up and shouted, "I will shoot any man myself who waves a white flag" and was fatally wounded.′ The RMO was killed while trying to treat his commanding officer for a second time. Things went from bad to worse, with the second in command also being wounded. Major Phillips, of C Company, assumed command of the Battalion.

  The business end of a dug-in German 88mm anti-tank gun.

  Back at Headquarters 130 Brigade, as far as the staff were concerned, 7/Hampshires were safely occupying Maltot. Despite increasingly desperate requests for artillery fire made by Major Penrose and 220 Battery′s observation officers, they were not shaken from the view that all was well. To be fair, the entire divisional effort was focussed on 129 Brigade′s foundering attempts to take key positions on the crest of Hill 112. To that end, all of 112/Regiment′s guns, not involved in maintaining the smoke screen on the left flank, were firing on Hill 112. The key to the battle was possession of 112. If it was not taken, the advance on the low ground by 4 Armoured Brigade would probably fail. It would seem that the fact that 7/Hampshires were already well into the low ground was, without reports from their battalion headquarters, ignored.

  On the German side, SS-Brigadeführer Heinz Harmel, commander of the 10th SS Panzer Division, quoted in one of the Frundsberg′s histories, summarized the situation at this stage in the battle:

  Heinz Harmel as an SS-Oberführer.

  ′Whilst our divisional and corps artillery, together with 8th Werfer Brigade, brought down a heavy curtain of fire to prevent the British developing their attack on the top of Hill 112, the [3rd] armoured battalion of the 22nd Panzer Grenadier Regiment and the 10th SS Reconnaissance Battalion were moved forward to counterattack at Maltot with the support of Tiger tanks from 102 SS Heavy Battalion.′

  The Hampshires′ war diary describes what happened to this counter-attack:

  ′It was not until the enemy were actually entering the battalion positions that the call for [artillery] fire was finally granted. A very accurate barrage was laid just forward of the fields …This undoubtedly saved the position.′

  The village of Feuguerolles-sur-Orne, and Harmel in his command-post half-track organizes the counter-attack against 7/Hamshires in Maltot.

  By 11.56, 9/RTR were reporting that ′the situation is in the balance at Maltot′. Both 7/Hampshire and A Squadron were under severe pressure from the counter-attacks. In fact, the armour and infantry were fighting separate battles for
survival, unable to support each other. The Churchills and their accompanying M10s were fighting a losing battle with mounting casualties, against the German armour, who were able to ′jockey′ from position to position on the ridge above the Maltot area. This gave both British armour and infantry the impression that they were up against almost overwhelming numbers of enemy tanks. They weren′t! However, the Germans were using Tigers that had vastly superior firepower shooting from excellent positions. The Adjutant of 9/RTR described the results of the battle:

  ′At this stage about three-quarters of A Squadron had lost their tanks and were trying to get back one way or another. The Padre and our own ambulances made repeated attempts to get forward to the squadron and succeeded in picking up about twelve men but the position was impossible.′

  Bombardier Douglas Lakey MM, a part of an FOO′s party has told of the last stages of the fighting in Maltot in very personal detail:

  ′My Bren carrier was then set on fire by an incendiary, the Sergeant signaller was still in the vehicle relaying instructions to the Corps artillery. At one time we ordered "fire as fast as you can", having previously given them our location – something went wrong and the medium shells all fell on our position. Meanwhile, I had taken up a position behind my vehicle and was using a machine gun to fend off advancing infantry. A platoon of German infantry could be seen a couple of hundred yards away advancing on our position – the carrier was on fire and ammo was getting low… I waited a few seconds until the German platoon had to pass a gap in the hedge and then gave them the full blast of machine-gun fire – they faltered and I shouted to my trapped colleague to get out [of the carrier].