Hill 112_The Battle of the Odon Page 2

  The River Odon running high, fast and deep with winter rain.

  Close country of the Odon valley; hedges and ditches ensured short fields of fire.

  Courtesy

  The Hill 112 area is open farmland. However, many of the surrounding villages were also a part of the battlefield and, consequently, were heavily fought over. Please respect private property in both open country and villages, particularly avoiding driving on unmade up farm tracks and entering non-public areas in villages. Adequate views of the scene of the action can be enjoyed from public land. In all cases, please be careful not to block roads by careless car parking. The people of Normandy extend a genuine welcome to those who come to honour the memory of their Allied liberators. To preserve this welcome please be courteous to the local people.

  The open plateau of Hill 112. The battlefield today is bisected by electricity pylons.

  Warning: Unexploded Ordnance

  Most of the Normandy battlefields were fought over for a matter of hours or a few days at the most. However, at Hill 112, the front fluctuated a little but remained bisecting the feature for over a month. Despite the improvements in the manufacture of shells by 1944, there are still a significant number of unexploded items of both British and German ordnance in the ground. These are potentially dangerous and are regularly turned up by the plough. It is worth bearing in mind that these items are twenty-five years younger than those found on First World War battlefields and, consequently, the explosive filling will have decayed to a lesser degree. It is best not to touch anything metallic found on the battlefield.

  Enjoy the tour.

  Hill 112 in 1944 shortly after the war had moved on.

  CHAPTER ONE

  OPERATION EPSOM

  Taurus over the Odon

  Most of the area covered by Operation EPSOM is not within the geographical scope of this book. However, the ‘high water mark’ of the offensive reached Hill 112. This chapter gives sufficient background to allow the visitor to Hill 112 to understand the context of the battle and describes, in greater detail, 11th Armoured Division’s capture and defence of the feature during the latter stages of EPSOM.

  Operation EPSOM was Montgomery’s third attempt to take Caen, which had been the 3rd Division’s D-Day objective some twenty days earlier. On this occasion his aim was to envelop the city from the west and to threaten to break out onto the more open ground south of the city. This would have secured the city’s important road and rail junctions and put the Allies onto the shortest route to Berlin. The Germans were bound to react to this attack and, in anticipation, they had been forced to keep the bulk of their panzer divisions facing the British Second Army. With the German armour effectively tied down around Caen the Americans could expand the Allied lodgement and subsequently breakout in the west more easily. Following a preliminary attack by 49th West Riding Division on Rauray, Lieutenant General O’Connor’s VIII Corps was to advance rapidly on a narrow front with 15th Scottish Division, to the River Odon. The seizure of the Odon bridges was to be the cue for 11th Armoured Division to dash for the River Orne crossings and the open tank country beyond.

  Bernard Law Montgomery

  Beginning on 25 June 1944, EPSOM was slow going for both the 49th West Riding and 15th Scottish Divisions. The salient or ‘Scottish Corridor’ that they created, was too narrow and with too many troops fighting off a single road. Consequently, VIII Corps was unable to develop momentum against the ‘loathsome’ but determined soldiers of 12th Hitler Jugend SS Panzer Division. To make matters worse, 49th Division’s advance onto the Rauray spur was checked by the young SS soldiers, making the already exposed ‘Scottish Corridor’ even more vulnerable to counter attack. The British armoured regiments suffered heavy tank losses, as they advanced into the depth of the Hitler Youth positions. On foot, the infantry’s casualties mounted under a relentless fire from well-concealed Spandaus and from the dreaded Nebelwerfers. The advance effectively became bogged down on the Caen – Villers Bocage road.

  Two teenage SS panzer grenadiers belonging to the 12th SS Hitler Jugend Panzer Division.

  A contemporary artist’s impression of the seizure of the Tourmauville Bridge. The width of the River Odon is exaggerated.

  On 27 June 1944, at 1800 hours, 2/Argyle and Sutherland Highlanders of 227 Brigade seized the small but vital Tourmauville bridge over the River Odon. Amid the fog of war they had abandoned direct attacks and succeeded in slipping through a gap in the Hitler Jugend’s ad hoc defences by commendable guile. Reaching the narrow stone bridge at the bottom of the narrow, steep sided Odon Valley they dug in and held on until reinforced. The tenuous toehold of 15th Scottish Division’s principal objective, boldly but belatedly, completed EPSOM’s first phase.

  11th Armoured Division advances to Hill 112

  Half an hour after the Argyles reached the Tourmauville Bridge, the leading Shermans of C Squadron, 23/Hussars, led by Lieutenant Pratt, ‘with great dash’ reached the bridge, much to the relief of the Scots. Crossing the bridge, as described in their regimental history, the tanks:

  The Tourmauville Bridge taken by men of the 2/Argyle and Sutherland Highlanders, 27 June 1944.

  ‘… ground along in low gear up a steep and twisting track through wooded and difficult country until they came out just south of the village of Tourmauville [south of the Odon], where, for the first time, they were able to fan out on ground that gave a good field of fire. Commanders and gunners strained their dust filled eyes. Were some of those bushes camouflaged tanks? One German experienced what was probably the greatest shock of his life. He appeared in a small civilian car from the direction of Esquay. Lance Corporal Evans put an armour piercing shot through the car at a range of twenty yards. Surprisingly the driver managed to get out and, though pursued by Corporal Hoggins with a Sten gun, he got away and was last seen going very fast in the direction of Esquay. This was followed almost at once by a short engagement with some guns and infantry in the area of Garvus.’

  Shermans of the 23rd Hussars heading towards the River Odon with a Honey light tank in the vanguard.

  Caen to Tourville road and the start line for 139 Brigade’s advance to the River Odon to establish a bridgehead.

  By 19.00 hours, both of the depleted B and C Squadrons were across the bridge, supported by Major Mackenzie’s H Company, 8/Rifle Brigade (8/RB) who, in their half-tracks, had accompanied the tanks.

  Following up, and trying to fight their way through the traffic jam of 15th Scottish Division’s supply convoys and knocked out vehicles, were 11th Armoured Division’s infantry brigade. At 20.00 hours, accurate information was scarce. Had we taken the bridge? Where were the enemy? No one knew anything for sure, except that 159 Brigade was to cross the Odon by dark. The commander of 159 Brigade gave what his battalion commanders considered an unreasonable H hour for the advance, but the force of his personality prevailed. After one of those confrontations, unique to battle, the tired, concerned and fearful commanding officers were ordered to be in position by 21.30 hours! ‘An order is an order! Carry it out or take the consequences! Into battle!’

  Men of the 6th Royal Scots Fusiliers advance under cover of a smoke screen at the outset of Operation Epsom.

  In the gathering darkness, after a chaotic advance, the leading battalions, 1/Herefords on the right and the 4/King’s Shropshire Light Infantry (KSLI) on the left, both managed to cross the Odon. 3/Monmouths (Mons) occupied defences on the north bank as brigade reserve. Major Ned Thornburn’s description of 4/KSLI’s advance to the Odon graphically portrays the type of problems the brigade encountered:

  ‘We set out along this forest avenue at full light infantry pace, interspersed with stretches at the double. I ran from one platoon commander to the next explaining what the plan for the attack was. Mine was the second or third company in the order of march, so at least I didn’t have the responsibility of trying to achieve the impossible task of reaching the main [Caen – Villers Bocage] road. I think we assumed that the enemy would be t
oo alarmed by our numbers to show themselves (how naïve one can be!). By 21.15 I knew we had missed the artillery barrage… I got my two leading platoons lying down along the edge of the forest… I gave the word to commence the attack and we crossed the road. ‘Time spent in reconnaissance is never wasted’, the book says, but of course no one had done any reconnaissance on this start line and when we attempted to charge forward we found the thickest thorn hedge any of us had ever seen in our lives – utterly and completely unappeasable. I ran along the road for 100 yards or so until I found a gate, and we all walked through it very politely! Little did I think that D Company would deliver its first attack in single file with the company commander leading and reading his map! …we walked safely straight down to the river where, believe it or not we found straight in front of us an ornamental bridge …and we walked 400 yards up a steepish pathway to find ourselves at the gates of the Chateau de Baron. We were on our objective without a single casualty and there was not a soul to be seen anywhere. It was about 22.45.’

  Site of the ornamental bridge across the Odon. This rickety girder bridge is positioned on the original abutments.

  The remainder of the Battalion followed on twenty minutes later.

  The Herefords had a less torrid time by simply following the road down to the Tourmauville Bridge and deploying beyond the Argyles. By dawn the bridgehead was firmly held by the dug-in 159 Brigade, supported by tanks of 29 Armoured Brigade. An excellent platform for exploitation had been formed, from which 11th Armoured Division’s tanks could advance to the Orne.

  After a sleepless night, at dawn on 28 June 1944, two enemy Mark IVs were spotted on Hill 112 and engaged at long range resulting in ‘one tank being knocked out and one being damaged’. These two tanks were a part of 5 Company, 12 SS Panzer Regiment who were leaguered up in Esquay, with their exhausted crews grabbing what rest they could. Otherwise, it was relatively quiet as 4/KSLI’s history describes:

  A Panzerkampfwagen Mk IV moves up to counter the advance of VIII Corps in the area of Hill 112.

  ‘Although no attack came in, a number of the enemy infiltrated between the company positions and made a nuisance of themselves. They first crept up and attacked the RAP at a range of about thirty yards, wounding two stretcher bearers. The reaction of the battalion was fierce, resulting in the expenditure of large quantities of ammunition with little to show for it. These were early days and the battalion was still green. It was soon realized, however, that indiscriminate fire against stray Germans in close country was of little value, and later these men – they were called snipers although they were very ordinary German infantry [Hitler Jugend] with the most rudimentary ideas of musketry – were hunted by small parties of men with more success, about ten of them being killed or captured.’

  Meanwhile, the commanding officer of the 23/Hussars, taking advantage of the Germans’ relative quiescence, dispatched B Squadron to the top of Hill 112. However, a Luftwaffe motorized flak battery, I/53, had deployed onto Hill 112, with its 88mm guns in the ground role.

  Luftwaffe personnel man an 88mm gun in the anti-tank role in the vicinity of Hill 112.

  Chateau de Baron. It was used as Battalion HQ and Regimental Aid Post by the 4th King’s Shropshire Light Infantry during Epsom.

  ‘C Squadron remained where they were to give B Squadron covering fire as they moved forward. Skirting the ruins of Baron, B Squadron approached the hill from the north as the lie of the ground gave most cover for an approach from that direction and most of the enemy fire seemed to be coming from the south [western] slope of the hill. They went for some time over open, undulating country, which was good going for tanks, reminiscent of the Yorkshire Wolds. One tank was hit by a 50 millimetre shot which broke its track, and Lieutenant. Cochrane’s tank was hit and destroyed. The crew got out and came under heavy fire from both sides …The Squadron had meanwhile, by moving round a little further to the east, had established itself on the northern part of the hill. The enemy opposition in the area consisted of dug-in tanks and infantry in position in a small wood. Their tanks had alternative sites to move to under cover and were almost impossible to get at. An attempt was made to knock them out with some self-propelled anti-tank guns which were under our command and were sent forward with B Squadron. It was unsuccessful. Medium artillery was tried without effect. Finally, rocket firing Typhoons were called up but the Tigers [almost certainly Mark IVs and Panthers of 12th SS Panzer Regiment] were well camouflaged and the pilots were unable to locate them. The Gunners put down red smoke to indicate the target. One round fell amongst our own tanks and the hillside was immediately covered in yellow smoke, tins of which were issued to each tank so that it could signal to our aircraft and assure them that it was friendly. It often worked. On this occasion the CO dropped the smoke in the turret of his tank to the great amusement of those who were near enough to see what happened and the discomfiture of his crew who found it rather overpowering.’

  B Squadron was joined by C Squadron, H Company 8/RB and Regimental Headquarters. Despite much manoeuvring and firing they could not shift the German anti-tank guns and losses of Shermans mounted. The smoke from burning tanks, including the commanding officer’s, started to billow across the battlefield. As the 23/Hussar’s ammunition was running low, H Company were sent forward to take the orchard on the top of the hill, which they did with some casualties. Rifleman Roland Jefferson recalls,

  ‘Hill 112 will always be remembered as our initiation into the real hatefulness of war. We found ourselves in a cornfield on the [western] flanks overlooking the valley leading to Esquay.’

  It would appear that the enemy were a largely armoured force, with only a company of panzer grenadiers on the hilltop, who fell back as the British infantry closed in on them.

  The news of the British capture of Hill 112 was passed to 8 Werfer Brigade by field telephone. Feldwebel Doorn, who answered the phone ran to get 6 Battery’s commander, who received the following message:

  ‘Sir, the British are on top of the hill. A Sherman tank has stopped just five metres from one of our observation posts. For God’s sake don’t ring – they’ll hear it. We’ll try and get back somehow. I don’t know what has happened to Leutnant Wernike and Leutnant Nitschmann. I think they must have been overrun.’

  In order to confirm what had happened, Feldwebel Doorn was dispatched with a patrol up the open southern slopes of the hill and was quickly seen and driven off with two casualties. His report to Hauptmann Gengl confirmed their worst fears:

  ‘It’s not just a couple of tanks up there! Tommy’s got antitank guns and part of a machine gun unit.’

  12th SS Panzer Regiment hastily planned counter-attacks. Panthers of 1/Battalion attacked from the south and Mark IVs of 2/Battalion came from the south-west. SS-Scharfuhrer Willy Kretschmar, aged twenty, commanded one of the tanks climbing the slope from Esquay.

  23rd Hussars’ Shermans and M3 half-track of the 8/Rifle Brigade at the foot of Hill 112.

  ‘When I came to the end of the cover provided by the little wood, I halted and had a good look around. With my binoculars I searched the country stretching away to our left, looking for tanks and anti-tank guns. Nothing suspicious! ‘Panzer advance!’ I shouted. We had advanced ten or fifteen metres when there was a sudden crash. The sparks flew. We had been hit from the right. ‘Reverse’ I shouted. SS-Mann Schneider reacted like lightning. Back we shot at full speed. Back into cover of the wood. And only just in time! The Engländer almost got us! A hairs-breadth in front of our panzer, armour-piercing solid shot was tearing horrible black furrows in the green grass.’

  The counter-attack of the Hitler Jugend was beaten off but not before knocking out more Shermans, some of which were battle casualty replacements and had just arrived. Further advance by 23/Hussars from the narrow salient, however, proved to be impossible. Despite their failure to retake Hill 112, the ring of panzers and the Luftwaffe’s 88mm guns, to the south of the feature, contained the spearhead of 29 Armoured Brigade. I SS Pan
zer Corps was not, however, content with containing the British, they wanted Hill 112 back! The young soldiers of 12th SS Panzer Regiment were to counter-attack again. SS- Obersturmführer Kaendler of 5 Company was with them:

  ‘My gunner, Willi Schnittfinke, reported a defect in the electric firing mechanism. We had to halt, and after a quick repair we were some distance behind the three panzers manoeuvring in front of us. SS-Sturmbannführer Mueller was also hanging back behind Porsch and Kunze. Kunze, in the leading panzer, referring no doubt to those hanging back, shouted over the wireless: “It’s all the bloody same to me! Advance!" Two hundred yards from the little wood Kunze’s panzer was knocked out. Only the gunner and driver baled out. Groeter, the driver, was visibly shaken. He said the shell had gone clean between his legs.’

  The counter-attack failed.

  Men of the Hitler Jugend Division manning a PAK 75 at Hill 112.

  A German Mk V (Panther) burns after a direct hit.

  German six-barrelled mortar, Nebelwerfer, or ‘Moaning Minnie’.