Dieppe_Operation Jubilee_Channel Ports Page 2

  German infantry advancing on Stalingrad in the summer of 1942

  Russia’s demands were strongly supported by the Americans, even though they themselves were unable at the time to provide significant material support, or troops, for an offensive in the West. Among senior American military and naval leaders, there was significant agitation toward concentrating their efforts in the Pacific against the Japanese. This pressure would prevail unless an offensive in the West was developed and executed within the short term. In both Britain and America, the public also agitated for offensive action to support the beleaguered Russians. During April 1942, mass rallies in both Trafalgar Square in London and Madison Square Gardens in New York called for ‘a second front now!’

  With pressure mounting at home and from across the Atlantic, Churchill and the British Chiefs of Staff were forced to develop plans for an offensive operation in the West. Proposals ranged from the grandiose but hopelessly unsustainable Operation Sledgehammer (the formation of a lodgement on the Cherbourg Peninsular) to more modest affairs. Whatever the scale of the operation, it was intended either to draw German divisions from the Russian front or at least to fix their existing divisions in place in the west, thus preventing them from reinforcing the Eastern Front. In pursuing this goal, Churchill stated that ‘we should not hesitate to put into effect this year any sound and sensible plan to do more to draw the weight off Russia’. As the spring slipped into summer, pressure remained on the British to take action. It is recorded in the Official History Grand Strategy series that:

  ‘Mountbatten also had a long conversation on 9th June with the President. Mr Roosevelt said he “wished to remind the Prime Minister of the agreement reached last time he was in Washington, that in the event of things going badly for the Russians this summer, a sacrifice landing would be carried out in France to assist them.”’

  However, despite laudable aims to relieve pressure on the Russians, the Allies lacked the ability to project and sustain combat power across the English Channel. It is noted in Grand Strategy Volume III that,

  ‘... the limiting factor as regards both the size of the force and the date was the lack of suitable shipping, especially tank-landing craft. Even if the initial assault succeeded, we should not have the craft to maintain it over the beaches in the absence of a port, and the ports of Calais and Boulogne were almost certain to be blocked.’

  It was against this menacing strategic background, with a lack of resources, and mounting pressure for action on mainland Europe, that the Dieppe raid was planned and executed. However, the strategic necessity of relieving pressure on the Russians was not the only factor at work.

  HMS Campbeltown rammed into the St Nazaire dock gates before she exploded.

  Combined Operations Headquarters’s (COHQ) star was in the ascendancy following the successful Commando attack on the port facilities of St Nazaire. Despite the seventy-nine percent casualties suffered at St Nazaire, the operation, overseen by Captain John Hughes-Hallet RN, blew the sea lock gates in a heavily defended port and was considered to be a success. It denied the German battleship Tirpitz the only dock on the Atlantic Coast capable of taking her. For operations against Allied North Atlantic convoys, Tirpitz was thus forced to operate from disadvantageous bases among the Norwegian fjords.

  The raid’s success against a strategically important target enabled Admiral Mountbatten, with a team of highly competent and ambitious young officers that he had gathered around him, to advance larger and more sophisticated raids on the enemy-held coast of France. The COHQ planners’ next step was logically to mount a raid that combined significant forces from the Royal Navy, the Army and the Air Force in an ambitious undertaking. The port of Dieppe was to be their target. Unlike Bruneval or St Nazaire, there was no single objective of overwhelming strategic importance: this confirms that the Dieppe raid was part of a pattern of increasingly larger raids, and that Combined Operations was entering the phase of preparations to return to battle with the Germans on mainland Europe. In short, the raid was an experiment in landing techniques, but it also had elements of strategic necessity, vis á vis the Russians as well as satisfying the ambitions of a new and favoured headquarters and its commander.

  Dieppe

  After the demise of Operation Sledgehammer, the COHQ Targeting Committee selected seven ports for consideration for a raid. All within the limited range of Allied fighters and fighter-bombers at this stage of the war. Of these ports along France’s Channel Coast, Dieppe was one of a group of relatively lightly defended potential targets, and at sixty-five miles south of Newhaven, it was within the Allied air umbrella. Even so, Churchill continued to advance numerous offensive schemes. The Chief of Imperial General Staff (CIGS) Field Marshal Alanbrooke confided in exasperation to his diary, after a three-hour session with the Prime Minister:

  ‘This meeting with Winston was typical of many others, when all difficulties were brushed aside and many unpleasant realities, such as resources available, were scrupulously avoided. He was carried away with optimism, and established lodgements all round the coast from Calais to Bordeaux with little regard to strength and landing facilities.’

  Field Marshal Alanbrook

  One of CIGS’s roles was to fend off the wilder ideas that emanated from Downing Street, other ministries and HQs, and to focus the underlying enthusiasm. Dieppe was only finally selected by Combined Operations as their next major target, however, after considerable debate. The planners’ underlying purposes were, according to the

  Official History Grand Strategy,

  ‘...to test the German coast defences and discover what resistance would have to be met in the endeavour to seize a port. It was hoped also to inflict heavy wastage on the German Air Force and thereby give some relief to the Russians.’

  Topography

  The Combined Operations report, issued in October 1942, described Dieppe in the following terms:

  ‘The port and town of Dieppe are situated in the bight between Boulogne and Fecamp on the north coast of France. The main part of the town is on the west side of the harbour at the mouth of the valley through which flows the river d’Arques.’

  The report goes on to describe the access channel into the port, the outer or Avant Port, and the inner basin, its facilities and the various locks and bridges.

  ‘The town lies in a gap about a mile wide in the cliffs at the mouth of the river... Dividing the town from the sea is a built-up promenade backed by a line of hotels and boarding houses. Between the promenade and the hotels lie lawns and gardens about 1,200 yards long and 150 yards wide. They are enclosed on two sides by broad boulevards, the Boulevard Marechal Foch on the north and Boulevard de Verdun on the south. At the western end of the lawns is the Casino. Immediately behind the hotels, the Town Hall, and the Tobacco Factory, is the Old Town.’

  To the east and west of the town, the chalk hills rise steeply from the suburbs, and in the eleven miles astride Dieppe, ‘the coast consists of high cliffs, only accessible for landing in a few places.’ Along this coast, the beaches were a narrow strip of stones and boulders, and apart from a few mouths of small river valleys, where there were small beaches, the exits up the cliff were up via narrow valleys or, in the worst case, up gullies. Planners were dubious about the possibility of landing tanks and vehicles on the small beaches at anything but high water, because of rocky ledges. Given the topography of the beaches, it was considered that:

  ‘The landing must therefore take place above half tide... and these conditions required come round about ten days in each lunar month. A wind of not more than force 3, with no swell, is also essential, and this reduces the chance of bringing off an operation of this kind to two days a month in an average summer.’

  Operational Planning

  ‘It’s on’ was Mountbatten’s brief annotation to the Targeting Committee’s report recom-mending Dieppe for the next major raid: on 4 April 1942, planning for what became known as Operation Rutter began. The COHQ report des-cribed Rutter’s
planning process, which was not without its difficulties:

  ‘It was early in April 1942 that the question of an attack on Dieppe was first examined by the Target Committee of Combined Operations Headquarters. About the middle of that month, the Planning Staff of that Headquarters began work on an outline plan of attack under the general direction of Captain J. Hughes Hallett R.N., who was subsequently the Naval Force Commander for the second attempt. It was realised at the outset, that, though intelligence reports showed that Dieppe was not very heavily defended, a town of its size could only be successfully raided if the number of troops used was considerable. It was estimated that as many as six battalions would be necessary. The question of giving them adequate support at once arose and the use of tanks was considered very early in the planning.’

  It was the issue of the deployment of tanks for the first time in a Combined Ops raid that largely defined the Dieppe concept of operations and the eventual plan.

  A frontal assault was not at first contemplated by the Planning Staff. They thought that the best places for landings would be on each flank at Quiberville, some six miles to the west of Dieppe, and at Criel-sur-Mer, about double that distance to the east. At Quiberville, the beach was deemed suitable for tanks; once ashore they would only have to go a short distance towards the aerodrome of St Aubin and to the high ground to the south-west and west of the town, both of them suitable objectives of which the capture would secure Dieppe from the west. The main obstacles which the tanks would encounter would be the Rivers Saane and Scie.

  A tank landing well to the east of Dieppe presented greater problems. ‘The beach at Criel-sur-Mer... might not be particularly suitable for the landing of tanks, but at that time full information concerning it was lacking.’ In addition, some planners thought that the tanks would be forced by the nature of the ground to take a route looping two or three miles inland. They thus ‘would have to travel some twelve or fourteen miles across an area of country held by a battalion of the enemy whose resistance might delay their progress’. COHQ had also decided that, considering the time of the tides and the likely arrival of Wehrmacht reinforcements, the raid had to be completed within sixteen to twenty hours, or two tides.

  It was largely considerations of time and armour that caused Mountbatten’s instruction to plan an attack that enveloped Dieppe from the flanks to be modified to include the option of a frontal attack. The main reason was that the beach at Dieppe was considered to be the only landing point ‘definitely viable for armour’. Sadly, this was based on an erroneous estimation of the consistency of the beach, and of the capabilities of the new Churchill tank, untried in combat, to climb the bank of large pebbles towards the Esplanade. The COHQ report described how the decision to take the frontal option was taken:

  ‘On the 25 April, the first formal meeting to consider the plans for the operation... was held, with Vice-Admiral Mountbatten in the Chair. The question of a frontal assault was discussed... The Army representatives explained the reasons which led them to favour this form of assault. In the first place, to land any force as far west as Quiberville would make a surprise attack on Dieppe more difficult to achieve. In the second place, tanks landed on that beach would have to cross two rivers, which might prove to be considerable obstacles. In these circumstances, the bridges over them would have to be seized at a very early stage in order to make sure that they were not demolished by the enemy. Lastly, all available intelligence at that time showed that Dieppe was lightly held by a single low-category battalion...’

  Churchill Marks I to III were used by the Calgary Regiment at Dieppe. This example is a Mark III.

  Even though COHQ’s had decided against the option of enveloping Dieppe from the flanks, the naval planners expressed doubt about the frontal assault, but not on naval grounds. Lieutenant General Montgomery, of South Eastern Command, argued strongly that the loss of surprise involved in the flank landings was a crucial factor in adopting the frontal assault against a town held by a few low-quality troops. However, as recorded in COHQ’s report, the meeting was impressed by the assurance that:

  ‘The frontal assault would be preceded by a bombing attack on the town, to take place just before the craft carrying the assaulting troops touched down. This bombardment would be of maximum intensity, and it was thought that the defence would be too confused by it and by subsequent attacks from low-flying aircraft to be in a position to offer stout or prolonged resistance.’

  A COHQ terrain, hightlighting the obstacles to armour south and west of Dieppe.

  Lieutenant General Montgomery photographed in the summer of 1942.

  This section of the report concluded: ‘The plan, which included the principal of a frontal assault preceded by bombing, was then adopted.’ The Prime Minister was ‘against indiscriminate bombing of French towns at night, but an exception would be made in the case of a coastal raid.’ The mounting opposition of RAF Bomber Command was more serious: they saw their participation in the raids as an unwelcome and unprofitable distraction at a time when they were concentrating on mounting thousands of bomber raids on the German homeland. Also approved at the meeting was the Home Forces’ nomination of 2nd Canadian Infantry Division, under Major General Robert’s command, to provide the assault troops.

  Churchills practise coming ashore from a Tank Landing Craft. Note the engineers laying pailing across the shingle.

  Once the frontal attack plan had been approved, trials were conducted, on what were thought to be similar beaches, to confirm ‘the performance of the Churchill tank on shingle.’ The trials were successful, and the outline plan, responsibility for which had been delegated by COHQ and HQ Home Command to Lieutenant General Montgomery, was issued to the force command.

  The framework of the plan was laid down by HQ South Eastern Command. However, General Roberts and his staff of Headquarters 2nd Canadian Division had to carry out a considerable amount of detailed planning and coordination between the various elements that made up the force, code named ‘Simmerforce’. The force consisted of about 6,000 soldiers, of whom nearly 5,000 (two brigades) were Canadians, approximately 3,000 sailors crewing a total of 237 ships ranging from large to small, and almost seventy squadrons of aircraft. It should be noted that seven of the squadrons that eventually took part in the raid were from the US Army Air Force, while the US Army provided a detachment of fifty Rangers.

  The outline of the plan that the Canadians worked on, at their HQ in Osborne House on the Isle of White, was as follows. Phase I was the embarkation of the force from the Isle of Wight and Solent ports; in Phase II, the Canadians would assault and occupy Dieppe; and in Phase III, the Engineers would carry out demolition tasks, and the intelligence officers would seize as many enemy documents as possible. Phase IV was the progressive withdrawal of the force and its re-embarkation, and in Phase V, the force would disembark on the southern coast and disperse to their camps in Sussex.

  In the assault phase, ‘Simmerforce’ would attack the pair of Wehrmacht coastal batteries (code-named Hess and Goebels) on the cliffs approximately three and a half miles respectively to the east and west of Dieppe. They were to be destroyed by two companies from 1st Parachute Battalion in a preliminary attack. Once the batteries that dominated the approaches to Dieppe were destroyed, the main landings could take place. A mile and a half to the east and west, the rampart-like cliffs were broken by valleys leading down to the sea. At Puys (Blue Beach), a single battalion would land, while at the larger gap in the cliff at Pourville (Green Beach), two battalions would land in succession, with the second of the two battalions heading for its objective, the airfield at St Aubin. As already indicated, the main assault would be a frontal attack on Dieppe itself (Red and White Beaches), to be launched by two battalions in the first wave, supported by the Churchill tanks of the Calgary Regiment. Then the third battalion would land and push on to objectives inland, while a Royal Marine Commando would remain embarked as force reserve. The Royal Marines would also mount a cutting-out operation to
seize German invasion barges in the port.

  The list of missions grew to no fewer than nineteen separate objectives, and during the planning process there were attempts by other organisations to have their requirements incorporated into the raid, which was reported as becoming a ‘serious nuisance.’ For instance, the Air Ministry’s Signals and Radio Direction Finding (RDF or Radar) Branch regarded the RDF station on the cliff a mile to the west of Dieppe as a ‘target of opportunity’. Their interest is entirely understandable. The RDF station was in an area that was to be captured anyway by troops landing at Pourville, and it would be extremely useful, though not vital, for a technician to see what could be recovered. Unlike the vitally important Bruneval Raid, the Air Ministry was unwilling to risk sending a qualified scientist, which confirms the lower priority it attached to the raid. Once the RDF station was included in the growing list of objectives, an RAF radar technician who had volunteered for ‘special operations’ was extracted from a coastal radar site on the Devon coast. Flight Sergeant Nissenhall is referred to in orders and reports as ‘the RDF Expert’ and landed with the South Saskatchewan Regiment.

  The Canadians

  Another factor in the planning of Dieppe was the increasing pressure ‘to get the growing Canadian Force into action.’ The Canadian Field Army had shrunk from a full Corps at the end of the Great War to a mere 4,500 regular troops, but Canada’s military strength lay in its part-time militia units, which were quickly mobilised and volunteered for service overseas. Meanwhile, volunteers swelled the number of recruits in training and, as in Britain, there were severe shortages of clothing and equipment. Despite these difficulties, the convoy carrying the 1st Canadian Division arrived in the Clyde on 17 December 1939, and from that date onwards they had trained and retrained. They were initially at Aldershot, which as described by Canadian Press reporter Ross Munro as ‘not a good introduction to England’.