Hill 112_The Battle of the Odon Page 11

  The Orchard today. The fruit trees were not replanted after the war. Still evident is the ditch and hedge that divided the area and gave 5/DCLI some cover.

  Pressure was mounting as 5/DCLI′s strength was gradually reduced by the counter-attacks. There was artillery fire but very little from Nebelwerfers. Presumably being of light construction and located in the forward battle area, they had mostly become casualties to the British artillery. The Mortar Fire Controllers of the Wyvern′s machine-gun and mortar battalion (8/Middlesex) however, now occupied the Orchard and not 8 Werfer Brigade. In a deteriorating situation, Major Fry of 5/DCLI, not knowing where the commanding officer was, had a difficult decision to take. Jack Jones recalls:

  ′We were in a ditch just inside the wood about ten to fifteen yards from the eastern corner. The noise of the artillery shells and mortar bombs was deafening. Occasional Verey lights went up and we were bringing fire down on the southern hedgerow. This cacophony went on for ages, then about 03.00 hours two men came along the trench. "TOO!" "Yes." "I am the senior officer of the DCLI and I would like you to report back to [Brigade] Tac HQ, "SITUATION CRITICAL. PERMISSION TO WITHDRAW". Major Kenyon replied "I cant take that message back as a verbal message, you 11 have to put it in writing and sign it." This was done in the bottom of the ditch, covered by groundsheets with the light of a map-reading torch. We mounted our carrier and rolled quietly forward down the hill and after a minute or two Sergeant Bob Tighe reached up and pulled both of my radio aerials down. "What′s up Bob?" I asked but looking up in the dark I saw the black and white outline of the German cross on a tank that we were passing in front of! Just as we were going under the tank′s barrel, a flare went up 200-300 yards away. "Foot down Phillips. Get a move on it!" In the pitch black, we belted across the open country.

  Jack Jones′s night drive into enemy lines

  ′After several hundred yards, the carrier dropped afoot or so onto a road and kit shot all over the road. Major Kenyon shouted, "Never mind the kit. Turn right and get moving." I said to Bob, "He′s gone the wrong way. He′s going behind the Hill!" After a pause Bob replied "He knows what he is doing". About half a mile further along the road, we passed infantry marching on both sides of the road and the occasional vehicle. In front of us, we could see a crossroads with a building on fire. Major Kenyon said that "there shouldn′t be a cross-roads and buildings here!" I replied, "I think its Avenay sir". We parked up between two non burning buildings. "Phillips," said Major Kenyon, "get the Bren and shoot anyone who comes through the gap." A couple of minutes later he reappeared and said "Get back in the carrier, all these chaps are Germans!" We started off back up the road and soon caught up with the column of infantry and vehicles, so we joined them! Several times Major Kenyon got off the carrier and went to look at the signposts. We passed a copse where there were lots off vehicles parked up [TAC HQs of 21 and 19 Panzer Grenadiers]. Soon we realized that we were through the infantry and on our own. We made it back to our own lines near Chateau de Fontaine …We reached 214 Brigade TAC HQ and delivered our message at 0530 hours.′

  The night went on, with 5/DCLI subjected to repeated bombardment and counter-attacks. Their strength steadily ebbed away as wounded were taken to the rear but the dead lay where they fell. Lieutenant Colonel James′s leadership and coolness in action were exemplary and did much to ensure that his battalion held its position when many other lesser units would have melted back to the safety of the Odon Valley. Major Roberts, one of the surviving company commanders said:

  ′The CO was magnificent. He set an outstanding example to everyone by his personal courage, endurance and irrepressible spirit. The position we were in would have taxed the most seasoned troops, and we were still rather green. But for him, I don′t know what might have happened.′

  The Return of 9th SS Panzer Division

  By early July the Germans had been forced to keep their most mobile and potent forces holding ground rather than being available to counter-attack and seize the initiative from the British. However, with the arrival of 277th Infantry Division from the Pas de Calais, 9th Hohenstaufen SS Panzer Division was released, from positions to the west of Hill 112, into reserve. The relief had taken three nights to complete. The SS soldiers, who had been in action since they arrived in Normandy at the end of June 1944, were in urgent need of time to rest, refit and to repair their vehicles. They moved into hides strung out along the wooded valley of the River Orne as far as Thury Harcourt and west to Villers Bocage and beyond. The much-needed rest enabled the 9/SS Repair Battalion to bring the Division′s armoured vehicle strength up to seventy-five tanks and assault guns fit for combat. Most importantly, this total included forty-three Panthers of 1/9 SS Panzer Regiment. Overall, on the morning of 10 July 1944, the Hohenstaufen′s armoured vehicle strength was just over fifty-five percent of its theoretical establishment. The field workshops had plenty more vehicles that, given time and spares, they were able to fix and so help to maintain the Division′s combat effectiveness over the coming days, despite heavy losses. As the units were refitted, they returned to reserve positions from where they could reinforce both II SS Panzer Corps and XLVII Panzer Corps. Elements of 19th SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment were deployed well to the west, behind the boundary between 277th and 276th Infantry Divisions and two battalions of 20th SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment were in close support behind the Frundsberg. Their presence was unknown to the British planners and their timely intervention, along with some of the Panthers of 1/9 SS Panzer Regiment, was central to the stopping of 130 Brigade. It must also be concluded that many of the Tigers reported by 7/Hampshires and 4/Dorsets were, especially in the late afternoon, Panther tanks.

  On the morning of 10 July 1944, as the scale of the attack and threat of a break-through became apparent, Headquarters Panzer Group West gave authority for 9th SS Panzer Division to return to II SS Panzer Corps command. They were to concentrate in order to mount counter-attacks in support of the hard-pressed Frundsberg who were struggling to hold the British. 20th SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment was in action relatively quickly but, previously having been badly hit by British artillery and fighter bombers when counter-attacking the EPSOM Corridor, moving the remainder of the Division back to Hill 112 was bound to be slow. A few vital vehicles could dash from cover to cover but, for the majority, the fifteen mile road move could only be completed in darkness, once the dreaded Allied ′Jabos′ were safely back at their bases.

  As the Hohenstaufen prepared to move, SS-Standartenführer Sylvester Stadler took command of the Division. A much decorated and highly experienced soldier, Stadler moved from SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment (Der Fuhrer) of the Das Reich Division, who had been fighting the Americans to the west. At a crucial point in the battle, a highly perceptive officer of the highest quality took command of the force that was tasked to restore the situation on the Odon front.

  4 SS-Standartenführer Sylvester Stadler. Photograph was taken when he was an Obersturmbannführer.

  With dusk falling, at 22.00 hours, the Hohenstaufen′s vehicles, lined up in hides, fully prepared for battle, took to the road. By 23.45 hours 2/9 SS Panzer Artillery Regiment, reported ′ready for action′. However, by 23.59 hours the Hohenstaufen′s commander, SS-Standartenführer Sylvester Stadler, was reporting that 19th SS Panzer Grenadier′s columns had become snarled up with the Frundsberg′s and 277th Infantry Division′s resupply traffic coming in the opposite direction. With no room to pass in the country lanes, 19th SS Panzer Grenadiers were marching the last seven kilometres to the battlefield on foot, as seen by Private Jack Jones during his adventure behind enemy lines! None the less, Stadler, having recced the area, briefed SS Brigadeführer Harmel, commander of 10th SS Panzer Division over the radio. ′Bollert′s mission, with Hagenlocher, is to take the eastern flank of Hill 112 [1/9 SS Panzer Regiment and 1/19 SS Panzer Grenadiers]′. Orders were later given to the Hohenstaufen to take over the responsibility for the attacks towards Eterville and Chateau de Fontaine. The 10th SS Panzer Division had
been fought to a standstill in its attempts to contain the Wessex Division′s attacks. The 9th SS had arrived just in time.

  After midnight, the Germans felt that the task of recapturing Hill 112 was not going to be easy and they were fearful that the longer the DCLI were in the Orchard, the more they would be reinforced. The words of SS-Mann Zemlitz, one of the few survivors of his company, illustrate the Germans′ concerns:

  ′One of our mortar sections, firing at the greatest possible elevation into the small wood, gave it everything, but the Englädnder had occupied it in strength′

  The German self-propelled 105mm guns, called the Wespe (Wasp).

  Because of the Germans′ concern, the first two companies, 5th and 16th (Engineers), of 19 SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment, were placed under command of 21 SS Panzer Grenadiers when they arrived to the south of Hill 112 at 01.20 hours. At 01.40 hours, 1/9 SS Panzer Division Artillery Regiment also reported ′Ready to open fire′, with the sixteen 105mm guns of their two self-propelled batteries. However, unable to take short cuts across country, their third (towed) battery with eight 150mm medium guns was still stuck in the traffic jam behind the lines. They did not come fully into action until almost first light. 19th SS Panzer Grenadiers continued to be fed into counter-attacks, piecemeal, as they arrived, until, fearful of a renewed attack from Hill 112, II SS Panzer Corps ordered them into defensive positions to contain a British attack. By 03.00 hours 2/19 SS Panzer Grenadiers were digging in on the southern slope of Hill 112.

  With 2nd Battalion in blocking positions along the line of the road, a thousand metres from the top of the hill, 19th SS Panzer Grenadiers launched a series of counter-attacks starting at 04.35 hours. From the south-east, came 3/19 SS and the divisional assault gun battalion and from the south-west, the 1/19 and 9 SS Panzer Battalion. The divisional war diary, however, records that all was not well with the troops regrouping for the attack: ′Hargenlocher (19 SS Pz Gr), south of Maltot, reports that the tanks had not arrived as predicted.′ In fact, his company of Panthers would not arrive until dawn. Because of the delays in the Germans′ rear area, Number 2 Company of 102/SS Heavy Panzer Battalion replaced the Panthers and attacked with 19th SS Panzer Grenadiers. Their axis of advance followed a lane that ran up the hill from the small village of Esquay SS-Mann Trautmann, a radio operator in one of the Tigers describes the attack:

  ′Shells were exploding on the hull and turret; they were breaking off branches in the treetops! Our panzer grenadiers couldn′t even raise their heads. Many brave comrades were left dead on the slopes.′

  Willi Fey described the British artillery during the counter attacks:

  ′Down came a barrier of defensive fire such as we Eastern Fronters had never known; the Russians never had as manyguns as this, and they did not use them in this way; and then came the thick smoke screen. Our attack folded up at the foot of the hill, before we even got on to the slopes.′

  Eventually one of the attacks reached the Small Wood when the Tigers drove blindly through the British artillery fire. The SS Panzer Grenadiers caught up once the British artillery observer covering the approach had been killed or driven off. There followed a short sharp fight with the remains of C Company 5/DCLI. This was the Tost company′ who had been out of touch with its Headquarters since the previous evening. Soon signals were going up the German chain of command to the effect that ′the Kastenwaldchen had been taken!′ However, unfamiliar with Hill 112′s geography 19 SS had in fact only captured the Small Wood on the southern crest, not the Orchard, which was still stubbornly held by 5/DCLI. But by first light, 3/19 SS followed by the 1/19 SS had secured positions on the southern edge of the plateau, on a line through Small Wood and the drystone wall that earlier sheltered 21 SS Panzer Grenadiers. They prepared to attack again and again, if necessary. The Germans had so far failed to completely retake Hill 112 but they had stabilized the situation with a ring of steel that would be difficult to penetrate.

  19 SS Panzer Grenadiers attacking Hill 112 up the southern slope. The black smudge top right is an airburst over the orchard on Hill 112.

  A battery of 25-pounders in action in Normandy.

  Hill 112 from the south looking up the Roman Road. This slope was littered with the dead and wounded of 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions.

  From the position of 19 SS-Panzer Grenadiers′ position. Clouds of smoke wreath the crest of Hill 112 while the SS prepare for their next attack.

  The Defence of Eterville – Night 10 / 11 July 1944

  Meanwhile, on 43rd Wessex Division′s left flank the situation in Eterville had been deteriorating. 9/Cameronians had taken over the defence around midday on 10 July 1944. A and B Companies were in forward defensive positions to the right and left respectively. C Company was in the centre and D Company was in reserve ready to link up with 7/Seaforths. They completed digging in during the afternoon, all the while under mortar and artillery fire. However, following the withdrawal of the Dorsets from Maltot and the breaking up of several counterattacks by the guns of 3rd AGRA, the Germans managed to work their way into Eterville. SS Grenadiers now resorted to stealth and found a covered approach through an orchard and into a gap between A and B Companies on the perimeter of the village.

  ′Soon after dark the enemy, about eighty strong, counter attacked "C" Coy. and secured a footing in the right forward platoon position, and then established themselves in an area which cut off "D" Coy. All communication with this Coy. was lost and every attempt to regain touch resulted in casualties.…The details of the fighting are obscure, but ′D′ Coy. HQ …were never seen again, and were presumed killed. The whole Battalion manned their alarm posts throughout the night, but at 3 a.m. on the 11th the enemy withdrew′

  Having penetrated the Cameronians′ positions the panzer grenadiers had run amok in the centre and rear of the Battalion area and at one time, the Battalion′s Forward Headquarters had been in danger of capture. The Commanding Officer had a miraculous escape when a mortar bomb exploded only just above his helmet and knocked him unconscious. The Second in Command and three company commanders were wounded. The situation was serious and Brigade Headquarters sent C Company 2/Glasgow Highlanders to help fill gaps in the defences around the village perimeter. Ordered forward just after first light, C Company took up positions in the orchard to block the enemy′s covered route into Eterville:

  ′They were almost immediately counter-attacked in strength by German infantry supported by two or three tanks. This led to a spirited defensive action by "C" Coy., who used their weapons including FIAT guns, with deadly effect. For a short time a party of enemy got a footing in the orchard, but Corporal Losimer led his section in a bayonet charge and soon dislodged them. In this action ammunition supplies were nearly all exhausted, the Company reserve ammunition arriving only just in time. When the enemy finally withdrew over 100 German dead were counted.′

  In addition to the 4/Dorsets′ casualties in taking the village, the defence of Eterville had cost 9/Cameronians, one officer and twelve other ranks killed and thirty-nine missing, but they also lost a total of 149 wounded. This was the third occasion that this Battalion had suffered this scale of casualties in less than a month. It was no wonder that Montgomery looked over his shoulder in horror at the rapidly dwindling pool of infantry replacements.

  The Cameronians were not the only ones having a difficult night on the low ground to the left of Hill 112. Outside the village of Eterville, 20 SS Panzer Grenadiers, having regrouped and reorganized after retaking Maltot, were preparing to follow up their success. At 04.00 hours, timed to coincide with one of 19 SS′s attacks on the DCLI, 1/20 SS (left) and 2/20 SS Panzer Grenadiers (right) attacked with the aim of containing 130 Brigade. By 04.35 they were between Maltot and Eterville and were reported as ′progressing well beyond Maltot′. This is not surprising, as the Wyverns had remained on the reverse slope, roughly along the line of the Caen to Evrecy road. While it was still dark one ′Point group reached the Caen – Hill 112 road and found it unoccupied. Pa
trols sent forward to recce enemy position. Engaged from the right [direction of Eterville] by MG fire.′ The same report also describes that the